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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a sample of up to 12023 firm-year observations across 2358 individual firms from 2007 to 
2013, this paper examines whether zero-leverage policy increases firms’ inefficient investment from 
the perspective of lack of bank creditors. Due to the lack of bank creditor monitoring, zero-leverage 
policy leads to more serious information asymmetry and agency problems, which are the two types of 
frictions that affect investment efficiency. The empirical results show that zero-leverage policy indeed 
increases inefficient investment. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate 
the effects of zero-leverage policy on inefficient investment. Our findings suggest that the sensitivity 
between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment will be lower in firms with strong external 
monitoring. Overall, the zero-leverage policy seems to be a key determinant of inefficient investment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
s we all know, bank financing can bring certain tax savings, reduce the free cash flow for the 
pressure of payments (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), and encourage managers to work hard. Besides, it 
is the main source of finance for Chinese firms. However, more and more listed firms choose zero-
leverage policy in recent years. From 1962 to 2009, about 10.2% of large public US firms have zero debt 
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2013). In China, the number of zero-leverage firms has increased from 49 in 2000 to 505 in 
2012, and firms with no debt has account for 20.73% in 2012, which are consistent with the international zero-
leverage evidence provided by Bessler et al. (2013). The international phenomenon that so many firms eschew any 
debt, which can’t be explained by both the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, is called the zero-leverage 
puzzle (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013[). Why do so many firms choose zero-leverage policy giving up the benefits of 
leverage financing? 
 
The most significant difference between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms in corporate governance is 
whether bank creditors exist. The lack of bank creditor monitoring in zero-leverage firms has certain effects on 
firms’ behavior. Hadlock and James (2002) show that bank creditors help to alleviate asymmetric information 
problems. In addition, Gilson et al. (1990) argue that creditor monitoring can substitute for ineffective board 
governance in financially distressed firms. Prior research has also shown that the monitoring role of bank creditors 
can mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers to some extent (Ang et al., 2000). A large body of 
literature shows that information asymmetry and agency problems are two main types of frictions that affect 
inefficient investment(Cutillas Gomariz and Sánchez Ballesta, 2014; Hovakimian, 2011; Chen et al., 2011), so the 
increase of asymmetric information and agency conflicts would further result in firms’ inefficient investment. 
Therefore, does zero-leverage policy increase inefficient investments because of lacking bank creditor? 
 
Recent studies on zero-leverage policy are mainly focused on firms’ motivations for choosing zero-
leverage policy. Our study instead tries to break the current research horizon and consider what effects zero-leverage 
A 
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policy has on firms’ capital investment. The main purpose of this paper is to figure out whether zero-leverage firms 
without bank creditors have more inefficient investment. Our study, which is focused on the lack of bank creditors 
in zero-leverage firms, is the first one to empirically examine what effects zero-leverage policy has on inefficient 
investments. Because we want to test whether the absence of bank creditors monitoring are the main determinants of 
zero-leverage firms’ inefficient investment, we introduce institutional ownership to examine whether the inefficient 
investment is mitigated by the increase of external monitoring.  
 
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, our evidence enriches the extant 
literature on zero-leverage firms. Our study tries to examine the investment efficiency of zero-leverage firms from 
the perspective of economic consequences, while previous studies mostly investigate firm-level fundamentals and 
firms’ motivations for choosing zero-leverage policy. Our paper thus fills this important gap in the literature 
examining the role of zero-leverage policy in a very different setting. Specifically, we deliberately “turn two dials at 
once” by moving from developed countries to emerging markets and by moving from firms’ motivations for 
choosing zero-leverage policy to its economic consequence. Second, our findings enhance the understanding of 
firm’s zero-leverage policy from the monitoring role of bank creditors. We focus on the difference, whether bank 
creditors exist, between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms in corporate governance while many studies only 
examine the characteristics and the quality of corporate governance in zero-leverage firms, ignoring the lack of bank 
creditor monitoring. Finally, this paper contributes to the limited literature on zero-leveraged firms by addressing the 
previously unexplored question: does zero-leverage policy without bank creditors increase inefficient investment?  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on investment 
efficiency and how zero-leverage policy without bank creditor monitoring affects investment efficiency, and 
develops our testable hypotheses. Section 3 mainly focuses on the sample and data, measurements of variables and 
describes empirical models in detail. The empirical results and discussion are presented in Section 4 and robustness 
tests in Section 5. Section 6 presents the main conclusion of this paper. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Determinants of Investment Efficiency 
 
According to the Modigliani-Miller (1958) paradigm, investment opportunity is the only factor driving 
firms’ investment policy. Under this theory, firms should invest all the projects with positive net present value 
(NPV) until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. However, firms’ actual investment may deviate from the 
optimal level due to some capital market frictions, producing underinvestment or overinvestment problems. 
Information asymmetry and agency problems are two types of frictions that affect inefficient investment. 
 
On the one hand, information asymmetry between managers and investors lead to underinvestment. Having 
information advantage about firms’ prospects, managers may try to time capital issuances to sell overpriced 
securities. If it is learnt by investors, they may ration the capital or raise its cost to avoid this, which may lead to the 
rejection of some profitable projects due to financial constraints (Biddle et al., 2009), resulting in underinvestment. 
Therefore, the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry becomes an important factor affecting the firm’s 
investment efficiency. 
 
On the other hand, ideally speaking, managers should always maximize the shareholders’ interests, 
however agency models suggest that managers are self-interested and may not always act in the interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which may lead to inefficient investment. The discrepancy of interests 
between shareholders and managers may cause managers to maximize their personal interests by making investment 
not suitable for shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), thus leading to overinvestment to build managerial 
empire (Hope and Thomas, 2008). 
 
The discussion above suggests that information asymmetry and agency problems can reduce capital 
investment efficiency by giving rise to frictions that can lead to overinvestment or underinvestment. Against this 
backdrop, we examine the effect of zero-leverage policy without bank creditors on inefficient investment, and 
analyze how zero-leverage policy affects the investment behavior both directly and indirectly. 
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The Role of Bank Creditor Monitoring 
 
The most significant difference between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms in corporate governance is 
whether there are bank creditors. Prior studies suggest that bank creditors, as monitors, play an important role in 
corporate lending (Wang and Xia, 2014). They can examine firm quality and discipline them through creditor rights 
enforcement (Qian and Yeung, 2014). We present the effectiveness of bank creditor monitoring in corporate 
governance. 
 
Why are bank creditors efficient in monitoring borrowers? First, the unique bank monitoring mechanism 
reduces credit risk by prior selection, daily monitoring and post-supervision. Bank creditors perform monitoring 
activities to avoid borrowers’ earning management, thereby reducing credit risk (Ahn and Wooseok, 2009). Second, 
the deposit relationship between bank creditors and borrowers is another reason. Through deposit services, bank 
creditors may possess timely and exclusively access to the borrower’s private information including the cash flows 
(Ahn and Wooseok, 2009). Therefore, bank creditors can effectively monitor the borrowers. Third, bank creditors 
can play the monitoring role by directly participating in a firm’s decision-making process. For example, they can be 
a member of borrowers’ board of directors.  
 
A large body of theoretical research explicitly analyzes bank creditor’s monitoring. Two major theories, 
banks are involved as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984) or information producers (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Campbell and Kracaw, 1980), are proposed to explain the bank creditors’ “specialness”. Diamond (1984) develops 
the delegated monitoring theory that bank has a net cost advantage relative to direct lending and borrowing. Fama 
(1985) shows that bank creditors enjoy a unique role as inside lenders because they obtain private information 
through their ongoing deposit relationship with the firm. These arguments indicate that bank debt is special among 
public debt and other financing sources (Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985[;James and Smith, 2000 ). Furthermore, 
Gilson et al. (1990) argue that creditors’ monitoring can substitute for ineffective board governance in financially 
distressed firms. Ahn and Wooseok (2009) examine the  bank creditors’ role in corporate governance in the US by 
investigating the effect of bank creditors’ monitoring on the borrowers’ earnings management, which is consistent 
with the study that banks are substituted monitors for some internal corporate governance mechanisms (Byers et al., 
2008). In addition, banks play an important role in examining firm quality and disciplining them through creditor 
rights enforcement (Qian and Yeung, 2014). 
 
Finally, prior research shows that bank creditor plays an important role in corporate governance, which 
can mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers to some extent, reduce the agency costs (Ang, et 
al., 2000) and alleviate information asymmetry(Hadlock and James, 2002). However, the agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry may increase with the lack of bank creditors’ monitoring in zero-leverage firms, thereby 
resulting in the inefficient investment.  
 
Investment Efficiency and Zero-leverage Policy 
 
In practice, bank creditor monitoring can reduce firms’ inefficient investments, so zero-leverage firms may 
tend to encounter more inefficient investment problems due to lacking bank creditors. We focus on bank creditor’s 
monitoring role to analyze how zero-leverage policy affects investment efficiency. 
 
We focus on the difference between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms in corporate governance and 
predict that the lack of bank creditors in zero-leverage firms will bring some changes to corporate governance and 
the relationships among various stakeholders. Based on this, we find that there are several mechanisms through 
which zero-leverage policy can increase inefficient investment. 
 
The lack of bank creditors in zero-leverage firms also increases information asymmetry and agency 
problems, thereby ultimately leading to these firms’ inefficient investment. First, the information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders leads to inefficient investment when cash flow is low because managers cannot 
convince shareholders that cash flow is insufficient to meet all positive NPV opportunities (Stulz, 1991). Hadlock 
and James (2002) suggest that banks help alleviate information asymmetry, and that firms weigh these information 
benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing banking financing, which can increase investment 
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efficiency. Consistent with this argument, many researchers have attributed positive bank loan announcement effects 
to the hypothesis that banks help solve their borrowers’ asymmetric information problems (Kang and Liu, 2008). 
Loan announcements provide information to the market about how bank invests to generate cash flows (Kang and 
Liu, 2008). Second, Ang et al. (2000) show that the agency costs of private firms monitored by banks are lower and 
conclude that bank creditor monitoring adds value. In addition, bank debt payments can force managers to pay out 
cash flow and hence reduce investment. As a result they can reduce free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), 
encourage managers, and mitigate the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers by making enterprises 
face regular repayment pressure. Therefore, debt can potentially mitigate the misaligned incentives and constrain 
overinvestment by reducing free cash flows and increasing creditors’ monitoring (Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996; 
Harvey et al., 2004; Paligorova and Xu, 2012).  
 
As discussed above, bank financing is a tool not just for financing, but also for corporate governance. Bank 
creditors have incentives and motivations to monitor operating performance. Ahn and Wooseok (2009) suggest that 
bank creditors perform special monitoring activities at lower costs because (i) banks are delegated monitors 
(Diamond, 1984), and (ii) banks have informational advantages (Fama, 1985). By screening and maintaining close 
relationships with borrowers, banks can obtain a competitive advantage over other capital market participants in 
collecting information about borrowers (Kang and Liu, 2008). Moreover, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) predict that 
debt-holder suffers after bad performance and equity-holder benefits after good performance. This leads to a partial 
congruence in interests between managers and equity-holders, and difference in interests in managers and creditors. 
In addition, the stricter monitoring and more restrictive covenants accompanying bank debt help to mitigate the costs 
associated with shareholder-creditor conflict (Shepherd et al., 2008). Therefore, controlling the bank debt issue can 
bring down the inefficient investment including overinvestment derived from managers’ self-interested behavior and 
underinvestment caused by information asymmetry between managers and investors. In consequence, without bank 
debt, zero-leveraged firms may face higher level of inefficient investment risks.  
 
Hence, given the argument above, the following Hypothesis 1 can be assumed:  
 
H1: Zero-leverage firms without bank creditors have more inefficient investments than leverage firms. 
 
Other External Monitoring 
 
Does other external monitoring mechanism influence the relationship between zero-leverage policy and 
inefficient investment? If the lack of bank creditor monitoring leads to the increase of firms’ inefficient investment, 
we want to further examine whether such effects can be mitigated by the other external monitoring. Here we take 
institutional investors as substitution. 
 
The role of institutional investors in external corporate monitoring has attracted wide attention and 
recognition. The institutional investors can pressure managers to orient their decisions towards shareholders’ 
interests (Gillan and Starks, 2000). What’s more, due to the high monitoring costs, only large shareholders such as 
institutional investors have strong incentives and capabilities to devote resources to monitoring (Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Cornett et al., 2007), which is consistent with the view that large shareholders may have a greater incentive to 
monitor managers than those having little wealth invested in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). And institutional 
investors can urge managers to focus more on corporate performance rather than opportunistic behavior, therefore 
mitigating the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers (Cornett et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2011). In 
addition, Bathala et al., (1994) argue that both debt-holders and institutional investors are considered to be important 
mechanisms for controlling managerial behavior and mitigating the agency problems. As a result, we can further 
investigate how institutional ownership influences firm’s investment efficiency as well as its impact on the relation 
between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment. We predict that the effect of zero-leverage policy on 
inefficient investment becomes weaker with the increase of other external monitoring. 
 
Based on above arguments, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: The sensitivity between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment becomes weaker when other external 
monitoring increases 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
In this section, we describe our sample and data, variable measurements, and the model specification.  
 
Sample and Data 
 
Our sample comprises unbalanced panel data in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 
2013. The reasons for choosing this period are: (1) the yearly number of zero-leverage firms is less than 100 (except 
in 2006) before 2007 and is less than 10% of the total firms, which shows zero-leverage policy in these firms may 
not be the result of managerial choice; (2) the listed firms adopt the new accounting standards in 2007. The data 
under new accounting standards would have better comparability.  
 
The data in this paper comes from CSMAR (China Stock Market Trading Research Database) and Wind 
Database, which are both extensively used in China. We exclude financial firms because their investment behaviors 
are different from those of non-financial firms. Firm-year observations with incomplete data are deleted. Outliers 
that may influence outcomes are excluded by 1% of two tails for each regression observation. Finally, our sample 
selection process produces a sample of up to 12023 firm-year observations across 2358 individual firms. 
 
Variable Measurements 
 
Dependent Variable: Proxy for Inefficient Investment 
 
Conceptually, inefficient investment means undertaking projects with negative net present value or giving 
up projects with positive net present value. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Richardson, 2006[33]), we measure 
inefficient investment as deviations from expected investment using a model that predicts investment as a function 
of growth opportunities, leverage, the level of cash, firm age, firm size, return on assets and prior firm level 
investment.  
 
Invest i ,t =α0 +α1RevGrowthi ,t−1 +α2Levi ,t−1 +α3CashHoldingsi ,t−1 +α4AGEi ,t−1
+α5Logsizei ,t−1 +α6ROAi ,t−1 +α7Investi ,t−1 + Year∑ + Industry+∑ ε
      (1) 
 
where the dependent variable Invest is firm’s new investment expenditure. The variable RevGrowth is the growth 
opportunities. The expected investment on new projects will be an increasing function of growth opportunities. In 
addition, the model of Richardson (2006) also includes leverage, the level of cash, firm age, firm size, return on 
assets and prior firm level investment, which are also the determinants of investment decision. Following 
Richardson (2006)[33], to control for the effect of unobservable firm characteristics on new investment expenditures, 
we employ the fixed effects regression models to estimate Model (1). The residuals from the regression model 
reflect the deviation from the expected investment level, and we use these residuals as a firm-specific proxy for 
inefficient investment. One of our proxy variables for inefficient investment (InEffInv) is the absolute value of the 
residuals, and higher value means higher level of inefficient investment.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
Our paper employs two important independent variables to test the hypotheses. First, following Devos et al. 
(2012) and Strebulaev and Yang (2013), we define the variable of zero-leverage policy (ZL) as a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm has zero book leverage in a given year and 0 otherwise. Book leverage is measured by 
the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities to total assets. And the book leverage of firms adopting 
zero-leverage policy equals zero.  
 
Second, following Lin et al. (2011) and Cornett et al. (2007), we utilize the number of shares held by all 
institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding as our measurement for institutional 
ownership (InstiOwnership). Considering institutional ownership an external monitoring mechanism, higher 
institutional ownership can reflect better corporate governance. Consistent with this view, Nikolov and Whited 
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(2010) suggest that measurements based on institutional ownership are less noisy proxies for governance than 
governance indices.  
 
Control Variables 
 
Following previous studies, we introduce several control variables in our models. As for the proxy for firm 
size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (Logsize). CF is the ratio of the net cash flow generated from 
operating activities divided by initial book assets, which provides a firm with financial resources for investment. The 
variable Cent10 represents the ratio of the sum of the second to the tenth largest shareholder holding shares to the 
capital in order to capture a balance of ownership structure from other controlling shareholders. We also control for 
a firm’s listing age (Lnage). The longer the firm has been listed, the more likely it is to be in maturity, suggesting 
reduced investment activity. RevGrowth is measured as sales growth. To measure firms’ investment opportunities 
we include the ratio of market to book value of assets (TobinQ). Finally, we add dummy variables to control for year 
and industry effects (Year dummies and Industry dummies). Table 1 provides a summary and the definitions of the 
key variables used in this study. 
 
Model Specification 
 
The Model (2) we propose to test the effect of zero-leverage policy without bank creditors on inefficient 
investments is as follows: 
 
InEffInvi ,t =α0 +α1ZLi ,t+α2 CF+α3Logsizei ,t +α4Cent10i ,t
+α5Tangibility+α6 RevGrowthi ,t +α7TobinQi ,t +α8ROAi ,t
+α9Lnagei ,t +α10MngHldi ,t + Year +∑ Industry +∑ εi ,t
      (2) 
 
where the dependent variable InEffInv represents inefficient investments. ZL is a dummy variable set to one if the 
firm is without bank creditors and zero otherwise. Since our Hypotheses 1 conjectures that zero-leverage policy 
could increase inefficient investment, we expect 1α to be positive. The rest are control variables that may influence 
inefficient investment, including CF, Logsize, Cent10, Tangibility, RevGrowth, TobinQ, ROA, Lnage, MngHld, year 
dummies and industries dummies.  
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Table 1. Description of variables. 
Variable Description 
InEffInv The absolute value of the residuals in the expected investment model according to Richardson (2006) 
InstiOwnership The number of shares held by all institutional investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding 
ZL A dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has a zero book leverage in a given year and 0 
otherwise 
Invest Ratio of cash paid to acquire fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets minus net cash 
received from the sale of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets divided by initial 
book assets 
TobinQ Ratio of market to book value of assets 
Lev Ratio of liabilities to book assets 
CashHoldings Ratio of cash holdings to book assets 
AGE Difference between the actual year and a firm's IPO date 
Lnage Natural logarithm of listing ages 
ROA Ratio of net profit to book assets 
Logsize Natural logarithm of book assets 
RevGrowth Ratio of the sale growth 
Cent10 Ratio of the sum of the second to the tenth largest shareholder holding shares to the capital 
CF Ratio of the net cash flow generated from operating activities divided by initial book assets 
Tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to book assets 
MngHld Ratio of the management holding shares to the capital 
Year Year dummies 
Industry Industry dummies 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of zero-leverage firms by time. The results reveal that over the period of 
2000-2013, 12.73% of the firm-year observations have zero debt, including short-term and long-term debt. More 
than one third (36.38%) of Chinese firms have zero leverage for at least one period from 2000 to 2013. Compared to 
US evidence (Strebulaev and Yang, 2013), the proportion of zero-leverage firms in China is slightly larger. Table 2 
reveals the considerable variation of the proportion of zero-leverage firms over time. This proportion averages at 
6.03% over the period of 2000-2006, but increases henceforth, rising sharply to 16.86% over the period 2007-2013. 
It shows that extremely conservative debt policies have prevailed in recent years around the world (Bessler et al., 
2013). A similar trend is documented in contemporaneous US research (Devos et al., 2012).  
 
Table 2. Distribution of zero-leverage firms by time. 
 Number of firm-year observations Number of firms Periods All sample ZL % All sample ZL % 
2000-2006 8817 532 6.03% 1482 215 14.51% 
2007-2013 14334 2416 16.86% 2538 851 33.53% 
2007-2013 
(Sample Data) 12023 1656 13.77% 2358 663 28.12% 
2000-2013 23151 2948 12.73% 2595 944 36.38% 
Note: This table summarizes the distribution of zero-leverage (ZL) firms by time, and lists the number and percentage of firms that have 
a ZL status (i.e., firms that have zero leverage) in a given year. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for zero-leverage firms and leverage firms. 
 Leverage firms Zero-leverage firms Tests 
Variables Observations Mean1 Median1 Observations Mean2 Median2 MeanDiff Chi2 
InEffInv 10367 0.0628 0.0480 1656 0.0831 0.0800 -0.0203*** 281.622*** 
Invest 10367 0.0723 0.0470 1656 0.0503 0.0290 0.0221*** 104.271*** 
TobinQ 10359 2.404 1.856 1654 3.748 2.738 -1.3434*** 322.429*** 
ZL 10367 0 0 1656 1 1 -1 1.2e+04*** 
Invest 10367 0.0723 0.0470 1656 0.0503 0.0290 0.0221*** 104.271*** 
CF 10367 0.0476 0.0460 1656 0.0675 0.0590 -0.0199*** 30.339*** 
RevGrowth 10346 0.226 0.126 1635 0.238 0.116 -0.0119 1.426 
Logsize 10364 21.91 21.77 1656 21.28 20.96 0.6310*** 355.040*** 
Cent10 10365 0.186 0.166 1656 0.234 0.224 -0.0480*** 96.988*** 
Tangibility 10322 0.950 0.967 1506 0.955 0.974 -0.0053*** 36.912*** 
ROA 10362 0.0296 0.0300 1656 0.0571 0.0540 -0.0275*** 172.303*** 
Lnage 10367 2.215 2.413 1656 1.950 2.150 0.2655*** 43.656*** 
InstiOwnership 10285 0.360 0.350 1647 0.346 0.312 0.0144** 9.642*** 
MngHld 10309 0.0491 0 1640 0.116 0 -0.0668*** 6.569** 
Note: This table reports the mean and median firm characteristics of zero-leverage firms and their comparisons with characteristics of leverage firms. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
The last two columns present ‘t-value’ from two-sample t-test and the ‘Z-values’ from the Wilcoxon rank sum test (difference between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms). *** denote 
the parameters are significant at the 1% level. ** denote the parameters are significant at the 5% level. * denote the parameters are significant at the 10% level.  
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We exclude firms with missing financial data and firms in Financial industry from our sample and finally 
get an unbalanced panel data of 2358 Chinese listed firms over the period 2007 to 2013 (12023 observations in 
total). In our sample, the percentage of the firm-year observations with zero leverage has reached to 13.77%. About 
28.12% of Chinese firms have zero leverage from the period of 2007 to 2013, which is slightly lower than the results 
over the period 2000-2013. It is just the reason why we choose the sample  period of 2007 to 2013 rather than the  
period of 2000 to 2013.  
 
Table 3 presents univariate comparisons of the characteristics of zero-leverage firms and leverage firms. 
The average inefficient investment for zero-leverage firms is 8% of total assets, which is significantly higher than 
the leverage firms, suggesting that zero-leverage policy doesn’t help to improve the investment efficiency. The 
average ownership by the second to the tenth largest shareholder for zero-leverage firms (23.4%) is higher than the 
leverage firms (18.6%), while the mean institutional ownership is lower for zero-leverage firms (34.6% vs. 36%), 
indicating that leverage firms have higher external monitoring. Consistent with  prior studies, zero-leverage firms 
are smaller (mean Logsize 21.28 vs. 21.92) and younger ( mean Lnage 1.95 vs. 2.215), have higher TobinQ (mean 
3.748 vs. 2.404 ) and higher net cash flow (CF of 6.75% vs. 4.76% ), and are more profitable than the leverage firms 
(Strebulaev and Yang, 2013; Bessler et al., 2013; Devos et al., 2012) . 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 4 provides the Pearson correlation matrix. Zero-leverage policy shows significant positive 
correlations with inefficient investment, indicating that higher level of ZL is associated with higher level of 
inefficient investment. And the negative relationship between the institutional ownership and zero-leverage policy is 
similar with the result of descriptive statistics analysis in Table 3. Other control variables are also significantly 
related to inefficient investment and investment expenditures. Correlations between the independent variables are 
not high, indicating that collinearity is not likely to be a problem in our study. As correlation results do not control 
for differences in firm, industry, or year characteristics, we then turn to multivariate analysis. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
The column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of the effect of firms’ zero-leverage policy on inefficient 
investment. It presents the estimation results of Model (2) using InEffInv as the dependent variable. In order to test 
our Hypothesis 1, we include ZL as an explanatory variable that we expect to be positively related to the inefficient 
investment. 
 
As we expected, the coefficient of ZL in column (1) of Table 5 is positive and significant, indicating that 
zero-leverage policy increases firms’ inefficient investment (we confirm H1), that is, the investment behaviors of 
zero-leverage firms are distorted heavily in some degree. For our control variables, we find that the sales growth 
(RevGrowth) has a significantly positive coefficient, showing that a higher ratio of sales growth leads to a higher 
level of inefficient investment, which is consistent with previous studies (Cutillas Gomariz and Sánchez Ballesta, 
2014). Moreover, larger firm, measured by Logsize, is associated with higher inefficient investment. Therefore, the 
results of Model (2) are consistent with our H1 that zero-leverage firms without bank creditors show higher level of 
inefficient investment than leverage firms. 
 
The Increase of Other External Monitoring 
 
How does the level of other external monitoring influence the sensitivity of zero-leverage policy to 
inefficient investment? As corporate external monitor, the  institutional investor is an important mechanism for 
controlling managerial behavior and mitigating the agency problems (Bathala et al., 1994). Therefore, we further 
shed light on this question from the perspective of institutional ownership. 
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Table 4. Correlation matrix. 
 InEffInv Invest TobinQ ZL 
Insti- 
Ownership CF Logsize Cent10 
Tangi-
bility 
Rev-
Growth ROA Lnage 
Mng- 
Hld 
In-EffInv 1             
Invest 0.538*** 1            
TobinQ 0.169*** -0.038*** 1           
ZL 0.123*** -0.097*** 0.226*** 1          
Insti 
Owner-ship 0.025
*** 0.073*** -0.097*** -0.021** 1         
CF 0.118*** 0.236*** 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.118*** 1        
Logsize 0.055*** 0.112*** -0.509*** -0.159*** 0.422*** 0.062*** 1       
Cent10 0.089*** 0.134*** 0.074*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.042*** 0.0120 1      
Tangi-bility -0.020** -0.097*** -0.186*** 0.030*** 0.040*** -0.086*** 0.091*** -0.00300 1     
Rev-
Growth 0.162
*** 0.211*** 0.056*** 0.00600 0.00600 0.150*** 0.052*** 0.066*** 0.00800 1    
ROA 0.00700 0.151*** 0.066*** 0.133*** 0.199*** 0.296*** 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.047*** 0.180*** 1   
Lnage -0.020** -0.200*** -0.0110 -0.142*** 0.084*** -0.031*** 0.104*** -0.373*** -0.038*** 0.0100 -0.118*** 1  
MngHld -0.033*** 0.096*** 0.044*** 0.154*** -0.225*** -0.022** -0.171*** 0.354*** 0.026*** -0.00100 0.099*** -0.567*** 1 
Note: This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix. All variables are defined in Table 1. *** denote the parameters are significant at the 1% level. ** denote the parameters are significant 
at the 5% level. * denote the parameters are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Institutional ownership and the effect of zero-leverage policy on inefficient investment 
VARIABLES InEffInv (1) (2) 
ZL 0.0142*** 0.0313*** (0.00162) (0.00256) 
InstiOwnership  -0.00383 
 (0.00272) 
ZL*InstiOwnership  -0.0517*** 
 (0.00598) 
CF 0.0389*** 0.0424*** (0.00520) (0.00520) 
Logsize 0.00563*** 0.00633*** (0.000498) (0.000530) 
Cent10 0.0294*** 0.0326*** (0.00440) (0.00450) 
Tangibility 0.0299*** 0.0357*** (0.00883) (0.00883) 
RevGrowth 0.0123*** 0.0117*** (0.000775) (0.000776) 
TobinQ 0.00690*** 0.00712*** (0.000319) (0.000322) 
ROA -0.0685*** -0.0640*** (0.00772) (0.00781) 
Lnage -0.00182* -0.00201** (0.00100) (0.00100) 
MngHld -0.0155*** -0.0226*** (0.00432) (0.00453) 
Constant -0.124*** -0.142*** (0.0143) (0.0147) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 11,712 11,631 
R-squared 0.132 0.138 
Note: This table presents the regression results on the effect of institutional ownership on the relationship between zero-leverage policy 
and inefficient investment. The sample consists of unbalanced panel data in China during the period from 2007 to 2013. The dependent 
variable is InEffInv. All variables are defined in Table 1. The standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the effect of institutional ownership on the relation between zero-
leverage policy and inefficient investment in column (2). We include institutional ownership and the interaction 
terms between institutional ownership and zero-leverage policy in Model (2) and re-estimate the inefficient 
investment model. The coefficient of institutional ownership variable is negative in column (2) but not significant, 
indicating that the institutional ownership has negative effect on inefficient investment. Moreover, our results in 
column (2) show that the coefficient of  ZL*InstiOwnership  is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that, 
ceteris paribus, the relationship between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment is weaker for those firms 
with higher institutional ownership (we confirm Hypothesis 2). Consistent with prior literatures (Chung and Zhang, 
2011[12]; Bathala et al., 1994[5]), these findings imply that institutional investors, as external monitors, can play a 
useful role in limiting agency problems. The sensitivity between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment 
might be lower in firms with higher level of institutional ownership because of the external monitoring by 
institutional investors.  
 
Therefore, the results are consistent with our Hypothesis 2 that the sensitivity between zero-leverage policy 
and inefficient investment becomes weaker when other external monitoring increases. 
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
In this section, we use the alternative investment efficiency model, sample processing using propensity-
score matching and the re-estimation of main variables to evaluate the robustness of the empirical findings.  
 
Alternative Investment Efficiency Model 
 
We estimate the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) as another 
measurement of investment efficiency as shown in Model (3) (e.g., Chen et al., 2011[11]). 
 
Invest i ,t =α0 +α1TobinQi ,t−1 +α2ZLi ,t +α3TobinQi ,t−1 *ZLi ,t
+α4ControlVariables+ Year∑ + Industry+∑ ε
                   (3) 
 
where the dependent variable Invest is a firm’s new investment expenditure. TobinQ represents investment 
opportunities, which is measured as the sum of market value of equity and liabilities divided by book value of total 
assets. Consistent with the literature, we include several control variables in Model (3), such as CF, Logsize, Cent10, 
Tangibility, RevGrowth, Markettobook, ROA, Lnage and MngHld. ZL variable is used to distinguish the effects of 
zero-leverage policy on investment expenditure. We test our hypotheses by examining the interaction between 
TobinQ and ZL. For all sample firms, we expect the coefficient of TobinQ* ZL to be significantly less than zero. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the effect of firms’ zero-leverage policy on the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunities. We use the model of the sensitivity of investment expenditure to 
investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) to test our Hypothesis 1 (e.g., Chen et al., 2011[11]). We examine whether the 
coefficient on interaction term between TobinQ and ZL is significantly less than zero. The sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to investment opportunities is positive and significant in column (1), which is consistent with the prior 
literatures. However, the coefficient of the interaction term TobinQ*ZL is significantly negative, indicating that the 
sensitivity would be reduced in zero-leverage firms. It suggests that zero-leverage policy is more useful to reduce 
investment efficiency. Therefore, the results of Model (3) using this inefficient investment proxy are similar to those 
previously reported, as displayed in Table 5.  
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Table 6. The effects of firms’ zero-leverage policy on the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities 
VARIABLES Invest (1) (2) 
TobinQ 0.00373*** 0.00582*** (0.000419) (0.000490) 
ZL  -0.00989*** 
 (0.00343) 
ZL*TobinQ  -0.00413*** 
 (0.000762) 
CF 0.115*** 0.119*** (0.00681) (0.00678) 
Logsize 0.0114*** 0.0106*** (0.000623) (0.000631) 
Cent10 0.0350*** 0.0339*** (0.00577) (0.00573) 
Tangibility -0.104*** -0.0909*** (0.0115) (0.0115) 
RevGrowth 0.0192*** 0.0185*** (0.00103) (0.00103) 
ROA 0.0243** 0.0349*** (0.0101) (0.0101) 
Lnage -0.0243*** -0.0247*** (0.00132) (0.00131) 
MngHld -0.000230 0.00137 (0.00567) (0.00564) 
Constant -0.0528*** -0.0579*** (0.0178) (0.0182) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 11,716 11,716 
R-squared 0.216 0.226 
Note: This table reports OLS regression results of the Model (3). The dependent variables are Invest. All variables are defined in the 
Table 1. The standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Sample Processing Using Propensity-Score Matching 
 
In order to reduce the potential for “overt bias” between zero-leverage firms and leverage firms, we employ 
a propensity-score matched-pair research design to choose paired sample according to Armstrong et al. (2010)[3]. 
The propensity-score method forms matched pairs of zero-leverage firm-years that have similar firm-level 
characteristics but different levels of leverage. This approach alleviates misspecification that occurs. In this study, 
we match our matched-pairs sample on four variables of firm size, market to book ratio, ratio of net profit to book 
assets and ratio of cash holding to book assets. Adding year and industry into the process of matching makes 
matching variables increase largely, which leads to that the matched results is difficult to satisfy the equilibrium 
conditions. As a result, we match our paired sample by year.  
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Table 7. Institutional ownership and the effects of zero-leverage policy on inefficient investment using matched-pairs sample 
VARIABLES InEffInv (1) (2) 
ZL 0.00713*** 0.0143*** (0.00192) (0.00324) 
InstiOwnership  
0.000593 
 
(0.00637) 
ZL*InstiOwnership  
-0.0205*** 
 
(0.00748) 
CF -0.00645 -0.00449 (0.00881) (0.00881) 
Logsize -0.0103*** -0.00933*** (0.00105) (0.00113) 
Cent10 0.000501 0.00325 (0.00810) (0.00821) 
Tangibility 0.0822*** 0.0850*** (0.0161) (0.0161) 
RevGrowth 0.00830*** 0.00791*** (0.00133) (0.00133) 
TobinQ 0.00312*** 0.00329*** (0.000422) (0.000429) 
ROA -0.0586*** -0.0541*** (0.0130) (0.0131) 
Lnage 0.0114*** 0.0114*** (0.00166) (0.00166) 
MngHld 0.0152** 0.00989 (0.00631) (0.00660) 
Constant 0.181*** 0.145*** (0.0281) (0.0297) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 2,484 2,478 
R-squared 0.238 0.242 
Note: This table presents the regression results on the effect of institutional ownership on the relationship between zero-leverage policy 
and inefficient investment. The propensity-score matching algorithm yields a primary analysis sample of 2683 zero-leverage-firm-year 
observations (1654 matched pairs). The dependent variable is InEffInv. All variables are defined in Table 1. The standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7 reports the results of institutional ownership and the effects of zero-leverage policy on inefficient 
investment using matched-pairs sample. As we expected, the coefficients of ZL and ZL*InstiOwnershi in column (1) 
and (2) are similar to those previously reported, as displayed in Table 5, which accords with our hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2. Overall, zero-leverage firms without bank creditors increase inefficient investment, and the effect of 
zero-leverage policy on inefficient investment will be mitigated by other external monitoring. 
 
Main Variables Re-Estimation 
 
Since zero-leverage policy variable is the central components of the model, we reconsider and calculate our 
aggregate measurement of zero-leverage policy. Because the definition of zero-leverage policy in this paper is that 
book leverage (the ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term liabilities to total assets) equals to zero. However, in 
order to avoid the leverage effect of bonds on the empirical results, we redefine the variable of book leverage as the 
ratio of the sum of short-term, long-term liabilities and bonds to total assets. With this approach, we aim to solve the 
inaccurate classification of zero-leverage policy and assess the robustness of results with variables that reflect the 
tendency of the firm’s zero-leverage policy.  
 
Taking these alternative specifications into consideration, the results (unreported) are consistent with our 
predictions. Zero-leverage firms without bank creditors show higher level of inefficient investment and the 
institutional ownership could mitigate the sensitivity between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we present evidence about the impact of zero-leverage policy on firms’ investment behavior 
in a sample of non-financial firms in China from 2007 to 2013. We first analyze the effect of zero-leverage policy on 
inefficient investment from the perspective of the lack of bank creditors and find that the inefficient investment 
problem is significantly more serious for zero-leverage firms than those for leverage firms. Second, we further 
examine the effect of other external monitoring on the sensitivity between zero-leverage policy and inefficient 
investment. The empirical results show that the sensitivity between zero-leverage policy and inefficient investment 
is mitigated by other external monitoring such as institutional ownership, which is consistent with our conjecture 
that other external monitoring helps control the inefficient investment caused by the lack of bank creditors. 
Therefore, we conclude that zero-leverage policy without bank creditors in China increases inefficient investment. 
 
While the related studies focus on analyzing the increasing prevalence of zero-leverage behavior in general, 
we explicitly analyze the effect of zero-leverage policy on firms’ investment behaviors from the perspective of lack 
of bank creditors. Moreover, we are the first to show that zero-leverage policy can increase inefficient investment. 
Our findings also have implications for a growing literature on the economic consequence of zero-leverage policy. 
We not only show new evidence about the role of zero-leverage policy without bank creditor monitoring in resource 
allocation, but also provide further evidence that the increase of other external monitoring indeed mitigate the 
influence of inefficient investment caused by the absence of bank creditor monitoring. These evidences enhance our 
understanding of firm’s zero-leverage policy and the important monitoring role of bank creditors in general.  
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